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on Cooperative Choice: Some Experimental Evidence
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This paper presents experimental tests of two models of cooperation in
prisoner's dilemma games (Kreps. Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson. 1982). The
models suggest that either a perception that the other party may use the tit-
for-tat strategy or mutual uncertainty concerning dominant noncooperative
strategies can lead to rational cooperation even in a finite game. The
experiment independently manipulated both types of uncertaintv and expanded
the design to include certainty as well as uncertainty of an opponent's
strength (operationallv defined as having a dominant noncooperative strategy).
The two parts of the research design allowed for inferences concerning the
plavers' prior, "homemade" preferences for cooperation. The results provided,
at best, mixed support for the models. Only in relatively restricted
situations did either type of uncertaintv promote cooperation. Instead,
players cooperated much more than was predicted; they also cooperated more
when they were certain of their opponents' payoffs.
KEYWORDS : Prisoner's dilemma games, uncertainty, strength, cooperative choice

The Effects of Strength and Uncertainty
on Cooperative Choice: Some Experimental Evidence
The classic prisoner's dilemma game continues to generate interest in
manv fields (e.g., Axclrod, 1984; Rapoport , 1988). Work by Krcps, Milgrom.
Roberts, and Wilson (1982) addressed one of the major theoretical paradoxes
observed in the studv of the prisoner's dilemma: On the one hand, the onlv
subgamc perfect equilibrium of finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with
payoff certainty and player rationality is mutual noncoopcration throughout:
on the other, plavcrs often choose cooperatively in such games.
This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to test the
empirical validity of two models (Kreps et al
.
, 1982) which require that both
parties be uncertain of each other's payoffs or that at least one partv be
uncertain of the other's rationality before cooperative equilibria can exist
in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. We experimentally manipulated both
of these uncertainty conditions. Rather than supporting the models, however,
the resulting behaviors indicate that certainty, rather than uncertainty, mav
contribute to cooperative behavior.
Early theoretical models of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
game indicated that onlv a single Nash equilibrium existed- -to choose
noncooperatively throughout the game. Neither player should be motivated to
choose cooperatively on the last trial. If neither expects the other player
to choose cooperatively on the last trial , the next to last trial becomes
1
. These models assume common knowledge by both players. That
is, noncooperation throughout the supergame is the only
sequential equilibrium with payoff certainty if both parties are
rational, as long as each party knows that the other party knows
that he/she is rational, etc. However, if there is higher order
uncertainty (e.g. player X is not sure if player Y knows that X
is rational), then cooperative equilibria may result. See
Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
important. The logic of the last trial can also be used to motivate the
noncooperative choice here and on every preceding trial, indicating that
neither player should ever choose cooperatively.
This prediction has been contradicted in single plav and finitely
repeated versions of PD experiments (see Axelrod. 1981; Roth, 1988; and Seiten
and Stoecker, 1986 for references). Factors that influenced the degree of
cooperation included pavoff levels and the length of repeated plav (Roth.
1988). While these findings appear to contradict game theory. Seiten and
Stoecker (1986) found that as plavers became more experienced they cooperated
less and mutual cooperation began to unravel earlier and earlier. Their
findings could suggest that subjects were moving toward the noncooperative
equilibrium as they learned how to bargain. Nonetheless, even their most
experienced subjects (i.e., those playing a 10-round, repeated PD supergame
for the 25th time), intended (on average) to cooperate for 55%-90% of the
supergame. Thus, the simple "backwards induction" argument predicting
noncooperation for the entire supergame is clearly not descriptive of people's
plav or their thinking about the game.
Andreoni and Miller (1990) also found evidence of considerable
cooperation in finitely repeated PD games with payoff certainty. Cooperation
was observed in both single shot and (more frequently) repeated games.
Further, as has been observed repeatedly (e.g., Wyer, 1969), parties were more
cooperative as their confidence of their opponents' cooperation increased.
In contrast to finitely repeated PD, cooperative equilibria may exist in
games with low probabilities of termination. This outcome occurs when the
future gains from current cooperation (i.e., future Pareto-optimal outcomes)
outweigh the gains from current defection. Roth and Murnighan (1978) have
shown that a PD with a given probability p of continuation to at least the
next round is analytically equivalent to an infinitely repeated game with p as
discount factor. Murnighan and Roth (1983) presented data from a dozen
different games that supported the basic prediction of their theorv.
Cooperation has also been observed for manv trials of a finite
prisoner's dilemma game (e.g.. Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Kreps et al
.
(1982) presented two models to explain these observations. Model 1 showed
that if one player thought that the other might not plav "rationallv"
(choosing noncooperativelv on every trial), but instead might plav the tit-
for-tat strategy, rational cooperative behavior could occur. Indeed, as long
as one player chooses cooperativelv and the other perceives that s/he may be a
tit-for-tat plaver. it is easilv shown that cooperation mav be beneficial for
several trials prior to the end of the game. Rational cooperative behavior,
then, depends on one player potentially having a "homemade" preference for
cooperation and on both perceiving that this possibilitv exists.
The Kreps et al . (1982) Model 2 indicates that cooperation can also
occur in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games when both players are
uncertain of each other's pavof f s . Essentially, both plavers must have some
uncertainty that the other player's rational response will be noncooperative
.
If both players perceive that the other may not be facing a dominant
noncooperative choice, they may explore the possibilitv of beneficial
cooperative choices by playing tit-for-tat. Should both plavers reason and
act this way, they may find themselves cooperating for some of the game.
However, if it is common knowledge that at least one party does not have such
payof f s - -i . e
.
, that noncooperation is a dominant single period strategy for
one or both parties- -then the backwards induction argument suggests that
cooperation will immediately break down.
While not based on PD , Camerer and Weigelt's (1988) experiments also
bear on the rationales for cooperation identified by Kreps, et al . (1982).
They established a lending game in which a "banker" (B) chooses whether to
"lend" to an entrepreneur (E) . B is uncertain about E's preferences to pay
the loan or to renege. Each E played eight rounds of this game against a
series of lenders. The results suggested that lenders had "homemade" prior
beliefs of the probability that E would prefer to repav the loan even when E
gained more bv reneging. Specifically, the E plavers repaid the loan more
often and later in the game than predicted bv a rational model. while Camerer
and Weigelt (1988) infer the existence of homemade priors, our methodologv.
described below, allows for a more direct examination of this phenomenon.
One part of our study, then, investigated whether expectations of the
other player's potential strategv would affect a focal plaver's cooperative
choices. We told plavers that thev would be bargaining with another plaver
who was following a programmed strategv. The program dictated that this
player would use the tit-for-tat strategv with either a .05, .35. .65, or .95
probability, depending on the experimental condition. Appendix 1 presents the
analysis of the two PD games we used (see Table 1), crossed with the four
probability conditions and identifies the conditions that should lead,
according to the Kreps et al . (1982) Model 1, to the potential for cooperative
choice
.
The use of a programmed opponent in this portion of the experiment
allows us to examine directly the idea of homemade priors on one's opponent's
tastes for cooperation. Specifically, we compared players' choices and
conjectures about their opponent when the other bargainer was a program and
when the other bargainer was a person (the focal party always knew which
situation s/he was in) , in the same games with the same payoffs and complete
certainty about those payoffs. Under these conditions, the onlv sequential
equilibrium in the actual opponent trials under player rationality is mutual
noncooperation throughout. However, as noted in Appendix 1, the programmed
opponent trials admit cooperative equilibria for portions of the supergame
.
We compared one's conjectures about Che cooperative behavior of an actual
opponent with conjectures about that of an opponent using a known program with
a fixed probability (5%, 35%, 65%, or 95%) of playing a tit-for-tat strategy.
Such comparisons vielded estimates about the focal plaver's prior
probabilities that the actual opponent would plav a matching strategy.
Our studv also established the conditions to test the second model
proposed bv Kreps et al . (1982). Two players faced each other in a prisoner's
dilemma game with uncertainty of each other's payoffs. We also looked at less
extreme forms of pavoff uncertainty, where one, the other, or neither party
was uncertain of the other plaver's pavoff s. We manipulated the four
uncertainty conditions in the two games in Table 1: The first is a prisoner's
dilemma game; the second does not provide one of the players with a dominant
noncooperative choice. In some conditions in this second game, the player
with the dominant noncooperative choice could be sure that the other did not
have a straightforward, rational motivation to choose noncooperatively . Thus,
we not onlv established conditions where the parties v/ere unsure whether their
opponent's payoffs dictated rational noncooperation. We also established
conditions where the parties were sure that their opponent's payoffs did not
dictate rational noncooperation. At the same time, however, the second game
yielded a unique Nash equilibrium dictating noncooperation throughout the
game. Both games are analyzed with respect to the conditions for uncertainty
in Appendix 2. Finally, we collected data on subjects' conjectures about
their opponent's likelv plav; such beliefs are an important part of sequential
equilibrium theories of bargaining (Kreps et al . 1982).
Methods
Subjects . One hundred and fifty-four students in the business school at the
University of Illinois at Urbana -Champaign volunteered to participate in the
study. Participating gave them a small amount of fixed extra credit in one of
8their courses, a common practice, and the chance for a monetary prize. The
studv was described as a bargaining experiment; at its completion, four
participants would win large monetary prizes ($200, $100, $100, and $100).
Procedure . People arrived for their hour and a half session in groups of six
to twelve. Instructions were provided about iterated dilemma games with known
termination points. Participants plavcd several example games, some with
symmetric payoffs, some asymmetric, always with programmed opponents. The
program gave each bargainer feedback about the range of possible strategics
they might encounter during actual bargaining. Thus, opponents' bids in the
practice sessions were occasionally cooperative (always labeled "A"),
occasionallv noncoopcrativo (always labeled "B"), and sometimes double-
crossing. The practice programs were consistently noncooperative after a
player had chosen noncoopcrativcly or after its own first noncooperative
choice. The program never switched from noncoopc ration to cooperation.
During the practice rounds, players could openlv observe others' choices
and outcomes. During actual play, all participants sat in isolated cubicles;
they could not identifv their bargaining partners. Everyone made their bids
simultaneously and secretly; their outcomes (and. bv deduction, their
counterpart's) were fed back to them after every trial. They were encouraged
to record their choices and outcomes from each trial. After practice but
prior to the start, they completed a short set of questions concerning their
expectations of the other person's play. In particular, they recorded the
earliest trial when they thought the other player would make a noncooperative
choice. Everyone was told that the sessions would terminate after the 20th
trial. After each session, bargainers responded to a short questionnaire
which assessed the effectiveness of the manipulations and various perceptions
of the other bargainer. They were then given new information about their
upcoming session and were randomly paired with another bargainer.
Most participants negotiated with two different players for two
consecutive sessions and then negotiated against a programmed opponent.
Others negotiated for four sessions, onlv against programmed opponents. In
each session, plavcrs were encouraged to do as well as thev could for
themselves. Pavoff possibilities were carefully described: Points scored in
the games were converted to tickets for a lottcrv held at the end of the
experiment. Doing better increased a plavcr's chances of winning one of the
four cash prizes. The first name chosen in the lottery won $200; the next
three won $100 each. The use of large lottcrv payoffs rather than small,
continuous pavoff schemes has advantages and disadvantages. In particular,
the high monetary amounts mav present more noticeable incentives. In
addition. Bolle (1990) has found evidence that lotteries generate results that
arc not significantly different from those which provide smaller, continuous
pavof f s . On the other hand, using lotteries dclavs potential pavof f s
.
Each session ended with a debriefing session, although the exact purpose
of the studv was not revealed until all of the data had been collected.
Interested participants were invited to request this information. At the end
of the experiment, we conducted the lottery and awarded the prizes.
The Two Games . The two games where both plavcrs were certain of each others'
payoffs are shown in Table la. Came #1 is refcrcd to as Strong-Strong: Both
players are operationally defined as Strong since they both have dominant
noncooperativc strategies. Game #2 is refcrcd to as Strong-Weak since only
the ROW player has a dominant noncooperativc strategy; COLUMN, operationally
defined as the Weak player, docs not have a dominant strategy. Thus, the
Strong-Weak game docs not satisfy the requirements of a prisoner's dilemma.
Both games were used in both phases of the experiment, i.e., when the players
negotiated with each other or with a programmed opponent. When COLUMN was
uncertain, COLUMN believed that Cames 3 and 4 (Table lc) were possible
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(depending on COLUMN'S own payoffs). Since players always knew their own
payoffs, however. ROW always knew that these games were not possible.
Actual Opponents
.
The design for this portion of the experiment included
three independent variables: The strength or weakness of the COLUMN plaver;
the ROW player's uncertainty of the COLUMN player's strength; and the COLUMN
player's uncertainty of the ROW player's strength.
The combination of these three variables meant that the participants saw
one or two of the payoff matrices (sec Table 1). The ROW player was always
strong, even though the COLUMN player may have been uncertain of this. In the
Uncertain conditions, players were told that the two possible sets of the
other player's payoffs were equally likely. For example, in Che Strong
-
Strong. Both Uncertain condition (Table Id), ROW knew that the payoffs of
Games 1 and 2 were equally likely and that Games 3 and 4 had no likelihood.
Further. COLUMN knew that the payoffs of Games 1 and 3 were equally likely and
that Games 2 and 4 had no likelihood.
Appendix 2 shows that with player rationality only three of the eight
cells in the design (Table 1) admit cooperative equilibria for some portion of
the 20-round supergamc: Strong-Weak (SW). COLUMN only Uncertain: Strong-
Strong (SS), Both Uncertain; and SW , Both Uncertain.
The clearest case for a mutually-cooperative equilibrium in Table 1 is
SW, COLUMN only Uncertain. In this condition, COLUMN perceives a 50% chance
that ROW is Weak--i.c., that cooperation is a dominant strategy for ROW.
Since COLUMN is Weak, COLUMN docs not gain even temporarily by playing B in
response to ROW's A play. Thus, COLUMN has a strong motivation to cooperate
in this game. The Strong ROW's motivation to cooperate comes from the idea
that cooperation may build ROW's reputation for having Weak payoffs, inducing
11
COLUMN Co cooperate. Further. ROW knows that COLUMN does not gain by plaving
B in response to ROW's A play - -COLUMN ' s onlv temptation to defect is to
protect him/hcrsclf against a Strong ROW. Appendix 2 shows that with the
pavoffs and knowledge structure in this condition. COLUMN should cooperate for
all 20 periods and ROW should cooperate until the last period.
The two other conditions in Table 1 viclding equilibria with some
cooperation provide less motivation for cooperation. In the SW, Both
Uncertain condition, both parties have an incentive to build a reputation for
weakness. However. ROW no longer knows whether COLUMN could make single -
period gains bv defecting from mutually-cooperative plav. If ROW acted
dcfensivclv to protect against such behavior, cooperation should have broken
down after 14 periods (sec Appendix 2). Finally, in SS, Both Uncertain,
reputation building behavior for portions of the supergame is again a
sequential equilibrium. However. COLUMN can now make a single -period gain bv
plaving B in response to ROW's A plav. Cooperation is predicted to break down
earlier than in SW, Both Uncertain (after perhaps 2 periods- -sec Appendix 2).
The five other conditions in Tabic 1 do not admit any cooperative
sequential equilibria. Note first that if COLUMN knows that ROW is Strong,
then cooperation should unravel from the last period to the first. In SS
,
Column only Uncertain, ROW knew that COLUMN was Strong; therefore, the
backwards induction argument applies here as well. Mutual noncooperation
throughout the supergame is the only sequential equilibrium.
Each pair's first bargaining session was randomlv chosen from among the
eight cells in the design (e.g.. Table 1). The second session cither
duplicated the first session, with a different opponent, or switched to cither
the Both or Neither Uncertain Conditions, also with a different opponent.
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Everyone's third session was against a programmed opponent; the program was
randomly chosen from the eight possibilities, discussed below in the
Programmed Opponent section. Data analysis indicated that order effects had
no significant impact on the results.
Programmed Opponent . This portion of the experiment kept pavoffs certain and
manipulated the uncertainty of the opponent's strategy. Participants
negotiated against a different programmed opponent for four consecutive
bargaining sessions, or after two sessions with actual opponents. They were
told that the program would play an unforgiving matching strategy, i.e., it
would choose A as long as you chose A but would choose B for the remainder of
the session once you chose B, with probability q. With probability (1-q) it
would play a strategy that might appear to be the matching strategy but would,
at some point, switch to B and never return to A.
The q values spanned a range of possibilities, equaling .05, .35, .65.
or .95. Payoff matrices were either SS or SW (Games #1 or i'2). Subjects took
the role of either ROW or COLUMN. For their four sessions, pi avers were
randomly assigned to one of the 16 possibilities: 4 (probability values) x
2(SS/SW) x 2 ( ROW/COLUMN ) . The opponent's programmed choices for the different
conditions were:
(a) q = .05: all B choices;
(b) q = .35, SS: match for 5 periods, then all B choices;
(c) q = .35, SW: match for 7 periods, then all B choices;
(d) q = .65, SS: match for 10 periods, then all B choices;
(e) q = .65, SW: match for 14 periods, then all B choices;
(f) q= .95: matching throughout until subject's first B choice; then B
choices for the rest of the game;
The number of periods the program cooperated was chosen on the basis of the
bounds computed in Appendix 1. These computations show that, not
13
surprisingly, we expected more A choices with higher q values and when payoffs
were S v . The program did not change for RO'a' and COLUMN conditions.
Results
We present the results in five sections. The first analyzes actual
bargaining pairs and determines whether the presence of a cooperative
equilibrium led to greater cooperative behavior. The second reports overall
analyses that compare the effects of games and uncertain pavof f s . The third
section analyzes the effects of repeated plav. The fourth analyzes plaver's
responses to programmed opponents. The final section compares plav against
actual and programmed opponents.
Actual Opponents . A stringent prediction would expect that players would
choose cooperatively in the presence of a cooperative equilibrium and
noncooperativel v when (1) no cooperative equilibrium exists or (2) the other
party has chosen noncooperativelv. The most cooperation (19 of 20 trials)
should result in the S/T- COLUMN uncertain condition, followed bv Sv -Both
uncertain (at least 14 trials) and SS-Both uncertain (at least 2 trials). No
cooperation should surface in anv of the other conditions. A more relaxed
prediction (Appendix 2) suggests that cooperation should be a positive
function of the potential gains to cooperation.
Table 2 shows results which generally support the predictions of
sequential equilibrium models for total cooperative choices in the SV- COLUMN
Uncertain and the SW-Both Uncertain conditions: Both cells generated more
cooperation than conditions where a cooperative equilibrium did not exist
(F(l,212) = 6.95, p < .01, and F(l,212) = 6.10, p < .02. respectively). 2
Similar comparisons for the SS-Both Uncertain condition arc not significant.
2 These tests assume independence of observations across members of a
bargaining pair. After correcting for such non- independence, in a generalized
least squares regression, the results were unchanged.
The proportion of first trial cooperative choices (which arc unaffected bv any
previous plav) were also more frequent, but not signif icantl v . for the SW-
COLUMN Uncertain and the SW-Both Uncertain conditions.
The other five conditions, however, show considcrablv more cooperative
behavior than predicted. Indeed, overall analvses, reported below, show
systematic, significant effects that do not depend on the presence or absence
of a cooperative equilibrium.
Figure 1 displays the mean frequency of cooperative choices in each of
the 8 conditions across trials, pooled over ROW and COLUMN players (who showed
similar patterns). The data fall into three distinct groupings: (1)
Consistently high levels of cooperation which onlv fall off after the 17th
trial (for SW- COLUMN, Both, and Neither Uncertain); (2) An initial drop -off in
cooperation, followed bv relatively stable and moderate levels of cooperation
that again fall off after the 17th trial (for SW-ROW Uncertain, and SS-ROW,
Neither, or Both Uncertain); and (3) a steeper drop-off in cooperation and low
levels of cooperation thereafter (SS-COLUMN Uncertain).
Several observations sum up these data: (1) Players choose
cooperatively much more than predicted; (2) End game plav docs not typically
begin until the 18th of the 20 trials; (3) The Strong -Weak conditions generate
more cooperative play than the Strong-Strong, except when ROW is uncertain:
and (4) The observations only partially fit the predictions that cooperative
equilibria will lead to more cooperative behavior.
Overall Analyses . The total number of cooperative ("A") choices in each game
was analyzed in a 2 (ROW/COLUMN player) x 2 (SS/SW games) x 2 (ROW
Certain/Uncertain) x 2 (COLUMN Certain/Uncertain) analysis of variance, with
players a repeated variable. A significant main effect for games, (F(1.197) =
41.25, p < .01) indicated that more cooperative choices were made in the SW
game. Three significant two-way interactions resulted, between games and ROW
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Uncertain (F( 1,197) = 4.95, p < .01), between games and COLUMN Uncertain
(F( 1.197) = 6.36. p < .01). and between ROW and COLUMN Uncertain (F( 1,197) =
7.50, p < .01). The means for these interactions arc shown in Tabic 3.
Tabic 3a indicates that when ROW was certain that COLUMN was Weak, the
plavcrs were significantly more cooperative than when ROW was uncertain, but
in both cases they chose more cooperatively than when COLUMN was Strong. The
Came bv Column Uncertain interaction indicates that, although the plavcrs were
significantlv more cooperative in the Strong-Weak Came, they were more
cooperative in SS when COLUMN was certain and were least cooperative in SS
when COLUMN was uncertain. Finally, significantly more cooperation occurred
when both plavcrs were certain of the other's strength (Table 3c) than cither
condition of one-sided uncertainty.
As one party's play is clearly influenced by the other's, we also
analvzcd each player's first choice, which were not affected by the other
plaver's choices. An analysis of variance comparable to that for total
choices yielded two significant main effects and one interaction. The effect
for plavers (F( 1.197) = 3.87, p < .05) indicated that COLUMN made more
cooperative choices on the first trial than ROW; the effect for games
(F(l,197) = 8.43, p < .01) indicated more cooperation in SW. The player by
ROW Uncertain interaction (F (1,197) = 4.64. p < .05; sec Table 4) indicates
that when ROW was uncertain, COLUMN was significantly more cooperative than
ROW
.
After they received information about the payoffs in their upcoming
negotiation, but prior to play, everyone also estimated when they first
expected their opponent to choose noncooperatively . A difference of means
test showed that mutual certainty led to ROW players expecting COLUMN to first
choose B, on average, 3.59 rounds later than when at least one side was
uncertain, significant (p < .05) on a two-tailed test. COLUMN players
16
similarly expected ROW s first B play, on average, to come 2.70 rounds later
when there was mutual certainty, a marginally significant difference (p <
.10). Analysis of variance yielded one significant effect, for mutual
certainty (p < .004). When the analysis was repeated with full interactions
between player, uncertainty, and game, F- tests indicated no additional
explanatory power over the simpler mutual certainty-player specification.
However, in the complete model, we obtained marginally significant results (p
< .10), indicating that noncooperation was expected somewhat earlier in the SS
game and somewhat later when both players were certain of the other's payoffs.
Linear and probit regression analyses confirmed the frequent finding (e.g.,
Wyer , 1969) that higher expectations of cooperation were associated with a
significantly higher incidence of cooperative behavior.
The Dynamics of Repeated Play . The dynamics of these games emerge as players
respond to each other's cooperative or noncooperativc choices. To assess
these effects, the data were segmented for two separate analyses (see Table
j), whether the opponent chose A or B on the previous trial.
Main effects suggest that ROW was more likely than COLUMN to choose
noncooperatively in response to a cooperative choice and that such reversals
were more likely in the SS game. The Game by Player interaction (see Table
6a) suggests that COLUMN almost never overturned ROW s cooperative play in the
SW game. ROW and COLUMN were about equally and least likely to follow
cooperation cooperatively in SS
.
The Uncertain-Uncertain interaction (sec Table 6b) suggests that
cooperation followed cooperative choices significantly more when both players
were certain of each other's payoffs and less cooperation followed when ROW
The analyses in this section violate the independence assumption of the
analysis of variance. Thus, they should be interpreted with extreme caution.
They are presented here only to illustrate the strength of some of the trends
in the data.
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was certain and COLUMN was uncertain. The three -way interaction between
Games. ROW Uncertain, and COLUMN Uncertain (sec Table 6c) suggests that the
least cooperation following a cooperative choice occurred when COLUMN was
uncertain of ROW'S payoffs and ROW was certain of COLUMN'S in the SS game.
High levels of continuous cooperation occurred in both games when both plavers
were certain of each other's payoffs.
Most models suggest that noncoopcrat ivc plav is the appropriate response
to noncoopcration bv the other player. The data, however, suggest that some
plavers did not respond bv immediately noncoopcrating and that the independent
variables led to significant variation in these unexpectedly cooperative
responses. The Games bv ROW Uncertain and the Games bv COLUMN Uncertain
interactions (see Table 7) suggest that when ROW was certain, plavers
responded to noncoopcrative choices depending on the game : They were
significantly less cooperative in SS than SW. WTicn COLUMN was uncertain,
however, significantly more cooperation occurred in SW . while when COLUMN was
certain, significantly more cooperation occurred in SS.
The Last Trial . Behavior on the final round approximates behavior in a one
-
trial game. Came thcorv predicts that of all the experimental conditions.
Uncertain COLUMN'S in the SW game should be the only players to ever choose
cooperatively on the 20th trial; further, this choice should only be made if
COLUMN perceives a probability of at least .46 7 (see Appendix 2) that ROW is
weak. The results support the prediction: COLUMN players who were uncertain
in the SW game chose cooperatively 28% of the time on the last trial: all
other players chose cooperatively at a rate of 10.5%; F(l,214) = 6.30, p <.02.
In trials where COLUMN was the onlv uncertain player in the SW game, he/she
chose cooperatively 40% of the time. While no cooperation is predicted for
cases other than uncertain COLUMN players in the SW game, observations of
cooperation may indicate players' tastes for cooperation or altruism.
18
Programmed Opponents . Players facing programmed opponents almost uniformly-
responded to a noncoopcrativc choice bv the program bv choosing
noncooperatively themselves (although these responses occasionally showed a
one trial lag). Thus, since the opponent's program determined manv of the
players' choices in 20-trial games, onlv the first trial choices were
analvzed
.
The results from a 2 (SS/SW games) x 2 (ROW/COLUMN pi aver) x 4
(Probability of a Matching Strategy Opponent) analysis of variance viclded a
significant Player by Probability interaction. (F(3.183) = 4.15. p < .05).
Post hoc tests showed no significant differences among the means.
A similar analysis of the trial when plavcrs expected the program to
first choose noncooperatively yielded a significant effect for Probabilities,
(F(3,183) = 3.81. p < .02): Players expecting the opponent to use a matching
strategy with a .95 probability expected significantly longer cooperation
(mean trial number = 13.7) than plavers expecting the opponent to use a
matching strategy with a .05 probability (mean trial number = 9.6).
Probabilities of .35 and .65 yielded expectations between the others (mean
trial numbers of 10.8 and 12.7, respectively).
Play in the last round of the programmed trials was extremely
noncooperative in all but one condition. Except for COLUMN players in SW
games with a Probability of Matching = .95. players chose noncooperatively at
least 91.7% of the time on the last trial. In this one condition, players
chose B on the last round exactly 50% of the time. This result was
significantly different from all others, which were not significantly
different from one another (p < .05, using the Ncwman-Keuls procedure).
Comparing Actual Opponent and Programmed Opponent Trials . The only difference
between the programmed and actual opponent conditions when payoffs were
certain was the presence of a programmed opponent whose probability of
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choosing the matching strategy was known. Analyses of variance compared the
plav against the actual opponents when both were certain and each of the
different probability (.05, .35. .65, or .95) trials. In addition, analvscs
were conducted pooling the programmed opponent trials. Dependent variables
were choices on the first round, the last round, and expectations of when the
opponent would first choose noncoopcrativclv . The only significant effects
were for COLUMN'S last round choice in the actual opponent bv .95 probability
pair (F(l,51) = 7.34. p < .01) and the opponent -game interaction (F(l,51) =
6.77. p < .02). On the last trial, COLUMN was more likely to choose
noncoopcrativclv against an actual opponent (both certain) than against a
programmed opponent with matching probability .95; this difference was
stronger in the SW game.
Against actual opponents, ROW expected defection after an average of
11.2 (SS) or 13.88 rounds (SW); against a programmed opponent, this
expectation ranged from 9.8 to 13.0 (SS) and 9.79 to 13.44 (SW), figures that
increased monotonicallv with the matching probabilitv. Thus against actual
opponents, ROW's expectations could be interpolated to correspond to a less
than 50% matching probabilitv for SS and more than a 95% matching probabilitv
for SW. When ROW players were certain of COLUMN'S payoffs, they treated
opponents in the SW game as they treated highlv probable tit -for -tat players.
Such a finding underscores the relevance of the idea of homemade priors on the
opponent's behavior.
In SW with actual opponents, COLUMN expected defection after an average
of 11.88 rounds; against a programmed opponent, expectations ranged from 9.43
to 14.25. Thus, in SW COLUMN treated actual opponents as having less than a
50% chance of playing tit -for- tat. Against actual opponents in the SS game,
COLUMN expected defection after 12.87 rounds; against a programmed opponent in
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SS, expectations ranged from 7.86 to 14.29. This implies that COLUMN
perceived over an 80% chance that ROW would plav tit -for- tat in SS
.
Discussion and Conclusions
While some of the results in Table 2 broadly support theories of
sequential equilibria, the data suggest that a game theoretic analysis of
strength and uncertainty is insufficient. Indeed, the fact that considerable
cooperative behavior resulted when no cooperative equilibria exist indicates
that models assuming complete rationality arc inadequate. Further, a weaker
hypothesis that cooperation is positively correlated with potential gains from
cooperation only receives weak support.
The major contribution provided by Krcps ct al . (1982) was to suggest
that cooperation might result when plavcrs arc uncertain of each other's
payoffs or strategies.' The data provide some support for the implications
that can be drawn from Krcps ct al
. (1982) --sec Table 8. In essence, the
results in Table 8 indicate that (what we have opcrationallv defined as)
strength leads to noncoopcration and weakness leads to more cooperative
action. Uncertainty increases cooperative action only when it is combined
with weakness (i.e.. the last two lines in Table 8).
The existence of cooperation when no cooperative equilibria exist has
been taken as indirect evidence of homemade priors that the other partv will
cooperate (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988). Our direct measurement of such
conjectures in the programmed and actual opponent trials points much more
strongly to the existence of such priors. Further, unlike Camerer and Weigelt
(1988), we did not need to assume that the parties used these priors in a
rational manner.
While the Kreps et al . (1982) framework provides some useful hypotheses
about the causes of cooperation, our results indicate that the process of
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conjecture formation raav be more complicated than a simple prior.
Specificallv
. if homemade priors explain cooperation where such an equilibrium
docs not exist, then our results implv that the conditions of the game affect
the formation of these priors. Mutual certainty of the other partv's strength
or weakness led to more cooperation, expectations of more cooperation prior to
plav. and more cooperation after cooperative choices bv the other plaver (sec
Table 9). The addition of uncertainty led to less cooperation when cither RO/
or COLUMN was strong. All previous theoretical models suggest that certainty
in a finite game where noncoopcrativc choices dominate for both players (e.g.,
the SS game studied here) should result in no cooperation. Yet SS plavcrs
with neither uncertain of each other's pavoffs averaged more rounds of
cooperation than anv other uncertainty condition in the SS game.
One possible explanation for this unexpectedly cooperative plav depends
on psychological factors, including: (1) the personal discomfort of
uncertainty: (2) the desire to avoid discomfort (i.e.. to engage in self-
protection): and (3) the fact that onlv two choices arc available in these
games. Because the noncoopcrativc equilibrium exists in all conditions of
both games, plavcrs mav have reacted to uncertainty bv choosing
noncooperatively . A systematic psychological discontinuity between the
certain and uncertain conditions mav have driven them to choose
noncooperativelv without noncooperative . anti -opponent intent. Indeed, this
reflects one of the earlier criticisms of research on the prisoner's dilemma
(Apfelbaum, 1969; Nemeth, 1972), that the noncooperative choice may be
perceived as defensive rather than offensive bv the person making the choice.
In economic terms, the existence of pavoff uncertainty mav raise the
transactions costs involved in reaching a cooperative outcome. Just as
uncertainty about economic events induces two contracting partners to plan for
more contingencies, so can pavoff uncertainty induce two bargainers to
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consider more potential scenarios. Further, with payoff uncertainty, it may
be difficult for players to identify the efficiency gains from cooperating.
Positing an effect for the discomfort of uncertainty also offers a
partial explanation for three other puzzling effects, listed in Table 9. ROW
cooperated less when ROW was uncertain. In addition, cooperation dropped
after a cooperative choice when ROW was uncertain and when COLUMN was
uncertain in SS . Although these effects arc less consistent, thev still might
be interpreted as general support for the concept of uncomfortable
uncertainty
.
In addition to possibly causing discomfort, uncertainty may affect a
plavcr's perception of the other player's "type" (i.e., the opponent's taste
for cooperation), as indicated by our results for players' conjectures about
their opponents' behavior.
The effects of uncertainty on cooperation and on players' conjectures
are reminiscent of Smith's (1989) observation that in experimental economic
systems. Nash non-cooperative equilibria arc more likely to be observed under
conditions of incomplete information. If the Nash equilibrium characterizes
the actual economy (e.g., something at least approximating a competitive
equilibrium), it may be that the economy presents people with more uncertainty
about agents they meet than do our experiments.
While pavoff uncertainty may theoretically lead to cooperative equilibria
under player rationality, such uncertainty may also make it more difficult for
parties to find a cooperative equilibrium. In the presence of homemade priors
about one's opponent's cooperation, the net effect of payoff uncertainty on
cooperation may well be negative- -the negative effects on the ability of
parties to negotiate cooperative agreements may outweigh the positive effects
of the existence of additional cooperative equilibria.
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While uncertainty raav affect plavers ' conjectures about each other's
behavior, our results suggest that the process in which these beliefs arc
formed mav involve factors in addition to the level of uncertainty. For
example, a seemingly puzzling result concerned the "homemade" probabilities
that COLUMN" apparentlv hcLd in the different games. Counter to predictions
from a standard game theoretic analvsis. COLUMN saw RO/.* as using the matching
strategy more in SS than in SV.'. One explanation for this result is that
COLUMN may have overintcrprctcd ROW s cooperative choices in SS. While our
analysis (in the appendices) suggested that cooperative choices should have
communicated no diagnostic information to COLUMN, the plavers mav have
responded not onlv to repeated cooperative choices but also to the unexpected
fact (cf
.
. Jones, 1990) that thev came from a ROW who was strong. Thus,
"homemade" probabilities mav have increased. At the same time, when COLUMN
plavers were weak, bilateral deterrence models (e.g., Lawler. Ford, and
Blegen. 1988) suggest that they might resolve the difficulties of their
asvmmctric power relationship bv preempting PvOW and choosing noncooperativcly
first, as they expected noncoopcrativc choices from ROW.
We have found evidence consistent with the idea that plavers'
conjectures about their opponent's likelv plav are important, as others have
also shown (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 1990: Camerer and Wcigelt. 1988: Wyer,
1969). In particular, cooperation in games without cooperative equilibria may
be explained by beliefs about one's opponent's tendency to match (Kreps et
al
. . 1982). However, such prior conjectures break down bv the final round:
we observed much more cooperative behavior on the final round when the simple
sequential equilibrium model (i.e., without tastes for cooperation or beliefs
that the opponent has such tastes) predicted this behavior. This finding
suggests that a study of the breakdown of such conjectures could vield results
with important implications for sequential equilibrium theories.
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Table L
The Payoff Matrices in the Different Conditions
(a) Both Certain :
Strong-Strong
.
Game #1
;
Strong- weak . Game •/ 2 :
COLUMN * COLUMN
A B A B
A (18,18) (5,20) A (18,18) (5,10)
ROW ROW
B (24, 5) (12,12) B (24, 5) (12,12)
(b) ROW Uncertain :
Strong-Strong : Game #1 OR Game #2 Strong -Weak : Game 42 OR Game »1
ROW does not know which payoff matrix is correct for COLUMN'S payoffs. COLUMN
sees the correct matrix- -the one listed before the word OR. in each game. 3ocr
know that ROW is uncertain and that COLUMN is not.
(c) COLUMN Uncertain :
Strong-Strong: Game £L Ojl Strong-Weak : Game 4_1 OR
Game £3: COLUMN Game #4: COLUMN
A B A B
A (24,18) (15,20) A (24,18) (15.10)
ROW ROW
B (18, 5) (12,12) B (18, 5) (12,12)
COLUMN does not know which payoff matrix is correct for ROW ' s payoffs. ROW
sees the correct matrix- -the one listed before the word OR in each game. Boer
know that COLUMN is uncertain and ROW is not.
(d) Both Uncertain : For ROW:
Strong-Strong: Game fll OR Game #2 Strong -Weak : Game 42 OR Game --1
ROW does not know which payoff matrix is correct for COLUMN'S payoffs. (The
first matrix in each pair is correct.) ROW also knows that COLUMN is
uncertain of ROW's payoffs. Each knows that the other is uncertain.
Both Uncertain : For COLUMN:
Strong-Strong: Game £L OR Game £2 Strong-Weak : Game 42. QR Game 4J±
COLUMN does not know which payoff matrix is correct for ROW's payoffs. (The
first matrix in each pair is correct.) COLUMN also knows that ROW is
uncertain of COLUMN'S payoffs. Each knows that the other is uncertain.
Table 2
Predictions that Cooperative Equilibria
Will Lead to Cooperative Behavior
Number of Cooperative Choices
Stringent Mean Total
Condition Prediction ROW COLUMN
SW COLUMN
uncertain 19 13.7 15.1
SW Both 14
uncertain or more 12.7 14.2
Proportion of Cell
First: Trial Size
ROW COLUMN (fl of pairs)
.80
. 73
80 10
15
SS Both 2
uncertain or more 7.5 8.0 53 .88 17
All
Others
(Pooled)
9.8 10.1 71 .76 66
Relaxed, Rank Order Mean
Prediction Total
Proportion of Cell Size
First Trial (*? of pairs)
SW Neither
Uncertain 4th 14.6 15.5 .88 .82 17
SW ROW
Uncertain 5 th 9.8 10.5 91 11
SS ROW
Uncertain 6th 7.6 .3 77 13
SS Neither
Uncertain 7th 10.2 9.6 80 .67 15
SS COLUMN
Uncertain 3. 3.7 .60 .60 10
No clear prediction can be made for this condition; it should
generate less cooperation than SS Both Uncertain and more than
SS Neither Uncertain.
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Table 3
Mean Number of Cooperative Choices
a: For the Game by ROW Uncertain Interaction:
Game
Strong-Strong Strong-Weak
Certain 7.4 C 14. 9 a
ROW
Uncertain 7.8 C 12. l b
b: For the Game by COLUMN Uncertain Interaction:
Game
Strong- Strong Strong-Weak
Certain 9 . b 13.
2
a
COLUMN
Uncertain 6.3 C 1 3 .
8
a
c: For the ROW Uncertain by COLUMN Uncertain Interaction:
COLUMN
Certain Uncertain
Certain 12. 7a 9.1b
ROW
Uncertain 9.0 b 10.4ab
Note: Within each table, means with common subscripts are not
significantly different from one another (p < .05) using the
Newraan-Keuls procedure.
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Table 4
The Proportion of Cooperative Choices
on Che First Trial by ROW and COLUMN
when ROW was Uncertain about COLUMN'S Pavoffs
ROW
Certain Uncertain
ROW Choices • 789
ab .607 b
COLUMN Choices • 731
ab .857 a
Note: Within each table, means with common subscripts are not significantly
different from one another (p < .05) using the Newman-Keuls procedure.
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance S ummary Table for Che Choices
Following a Cooperative (A) or Noncooperative (B)
Choice bv the Other PI aver
Opponent's Previous Opponent's Previous
Choice Was A Choice Was 3
(n = 2245) (n = 1859)
GAME
PLAYER
COL UNCERTAIN
ROW UNCERTAIN
PLAYER -GAME
PLAYER-COL UNC
PLAYER -ROW UNC
GAME -COL UNC
GAME -ROW UNC
COL UNC -ROW UNC
PLAYER -GAME -COL UNC
PLAYER -GAME -ROW UNC
PLAYER -COL UNC -ROW UNC
GAME -COL UNC -ROW UNC
PLAYER -GAME -ROW UNC-
COL UNC 1.219 .270 2.719 .099
Note: GAME = SS or SW
PLAYER = ROW or COLUMN
COL UNC - COLUMN Certain or Uncertain
ROW UNC - ROW Certain or Uncertain
23.274 .000 .743 .389
84.172 .000 1.971 .161
3.599 .058 .000 .984
2.498 .114 1.049 .306
14.543 .000 1.300 .254
.153 .696 .438 .508
3.048 .081 .010 .922
1.598 .206 30.796 .000
.519 .471 8.538 .004
8.27 .004 1.01 .314
.561 .454 .465 .495
2.895 .089 1.001 .317
.143 .705 .750 . 337
18.702 .000 2.877 .090
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Table 6
The Proportion of Cooperative Choices
Following a Cooperative Choice by the Other Plaver
a: The Game by Player Interaction
Game
Strong-Strong Strong- Weak
ROW Choices . 737 -828,
C D
COLUMN Choices .739 .946
c a
b: The Uncertainties Interaction
ROW
COLUMN
Certain Uncertain
Certain .871 -820,
a b
Uncertain
•
790 b - 8I2 b
c: The Games by Uncertainties Interaction
COLUMN
Strong-Strong
:
Certain Uncertain
Certain 807 bc •562 e
ROW
Uncertain .688d cd
Strong-Weak:
Certain .908
a
• 887
ab
ROW
Uncertain 882
ab ab
Note: Within each table, means with common subscripts are not signif icantl
y
different from one another (p < .05) using the Newman-Keuls procedure.
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Table 7
The Proportion of Cooperative Choices
Following a Noncooperative Choice by the Other Plaver
Game
Strong-Strong Strong -Weak
Certain -100, .180
b c
Uncertain .146 , .131 ,
ab ab
Certain -157, -093 ob c
COLUMN
Uncertain .098 .221,
c a
Note: Within each table, means with common subscripts are not significant!
different from one another (p < .05) using the Newman -Keuls procedure.
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Tabic 8
Findings in Support of Came Theoretic Predictions
-an increase in cooperation when a cooperative equilibrium exists
-more cooperation (total and first play) in SW
-COLUMN more cooperative than ROW on the first trial
-noncoopcration expected earlier in SS
-following a cooperative choice:
more noncoopcration bv ROW than COLUMN
more noncoopcration in SS
almost total cooperation bv COLUMN in SW
-expectations of first trial noncoopcration in line with
probabilities of matching bv programmed opponent
-COLUMN more cooperative against .95 matching programmed than
against actual opponent, especially in SW
-"homemade" probabilities for ROW appear to be less than 50%
matching in SS and more than 95% matching in SW
-COLUMN most cooperative on last trial when uncertain in SW
-weak, uncertain COLUMN leads to more cooperation; strong,
certain COLUMN leads to less cooperation
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Table 9
Non-Predicted Findings
-more cooperative behavior when both players are certain of each other's
payoffs
-noncooperation expected later when both players are certain of each other's
payoffs
-after a cooperative choice, more cooperation when either or both players are
certain of the other's payoffs
-"homemade" probabilities for COLUMN appear to be more than 80% matching in SS
and less than 50% matching in SW
-after a cooperative choice, less cooperation when ROW is uncertain and COLUMN
is certain
-after a cooperative choice, less cooperation when COLUMN was uncertain in SS
-players are more cooperative on the last trial if ROW is certain in SS ; less
cooperative if ROW is certain in SW
-when ROW is uncertain: less cooperation by ROW
more cooperation by COLUMN
igure 1. Mean Frequencies of Cooperation with Actual Opponents over Trials
1
e. 8
0.6
i i r
0.4
8.2
sscu
* h
—
J I J L J L
9 4 8 12 16 2e
Trials
'ote : s = strong: w = weak: r = row; c = column: u = uncertain: b = both: n = neither
36
Appendix 1
Equilibria in Games Against Programmed Opponents
.
We analyze behavior of subjects under four cases: (i) Strong-Strong.
ROW subject. COLUMN program; (ii) Strong-Strong, ROW program. COLUMN subject
(iii) Strong-Weak. ROW subject, COLUMN program; (iv) Strong-Weak. ROW program,
COLUMN subject. In each case, we manipulate the reported probability- chat thj
program is instructed to match until the subject's first defection from A;
this probability takes on values of .05, .35, .65, and .95. Further, ccmple:;
payoff certainty is assumed throughout. As in Kreps , et. al (1982). we
compute lower bounds for the number of periods of cooperation.
Case 1; Strong-Strong. ROW subject. COLUMN program
In this case, ROW perceives a probability q that COLUMN will match until
ROW's first B choice; COLUMN chooses B thereafter. Suppose that n periods
remain. Then the expected payoff in the rest of the game to ROW if ROW has
just chosen A is:
> 18qn + (l-q)(5+12(n-l)) = 6nq + 7q + 12n - 7.
ROW's expected payoff if ROW had just chosen B is:
> 5 + q(n-l)18 + ( 1-q ) ( 5+12(n- 2 ) ) = 6nq + q +12n - 14.
By matching ROW, a rational COLUMN can always get to within 19 of ROW's total
return. By examining these payoff lower bounds for ROW, we can compute bounds
for COLUMN'S payoffs under various strategies. COLUMN'S return to choosing B
now (with n periods to go) is:
< 20 + (n-l)12 - 8 + 12n.
COLUMN'S return to choosing A now is:
> 5 + 5 + q(n-2)18 + ( 1-q) ( 5+12(n- 3 ) ) - 19 - 6nq - 5q + 12n - 40.
That is, COLUMN can get to within 19 of ROW's payoff for the game with n-1
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stages left. Thus the rational COLUMN will choose A now if:
Al-1 ) 6nq - 5q + L2n - 40 > 8 + I2n, or
48-5q
6q
i
Row should know that COLUMN will match as long as Al-2) holds. Thus, until at
most n periods remain, ROW is effectively playing against an opponent who
plays tit-for-tat (with permanent defection to B in response to ROW s first 3
choice) with probability 1. Therefore, ROW will choose B no earlier than with
n periods left. In this case, we have the following relationship between n
and q :
a D
05 159.2
35 22.0
65 11.5
95 7.6
Note that these may be loose bounds for the earliest period during which
defection may occur.
Case 2: Strong-Strong. ROW program. COLUMN subject
In this case, ROW can always get to within 15 of COLUMN'S total return
by simply matching COLUMN. With n periods left, ROW s return to a 3 choice
now is:
< 24 + (n-l)12 - 12 + 12n.
Row's return to cooperating now is:
> 5 + 5 + q(n-2)18 + ( 1-q) ( 5+12(n- 3 ) ) - 15.
That is, ROW can get to within 15 of COLUMN'S payoffs for the last n-1
periods. Thus ROW should cooperate if:
AlO) 6nq - 5q + 12n - 36 > 12 + L2n or
- 48-5q
Al-4 ) n > -.
6q
This is che same condition as for Case 1.
•
Case 3: Strong-Weak. ROW subject. COLUMN program
Here, COLUMN'S return to a B choice with n periods left is
< 12n.
COLUMN'S return to an A choice is:
> 6nq - 5q + 12n - 40 (see Case 1 above).
COLUMN should cooperate if:
Al-5 ) 6nq - 5q + 12n - 40 > 12n, or if
40-5q
Al-6 ) n > -.
" 6q
The relationship between n and q is:
a n
05 132.5
35 18.2
65 9.4
95 6.2
Case 4: Strong-Weak. ROW program. COLUMN subject
In this instance, ROW can always get to within 5 of COLUMN. ROW '
s
return to a B choice with n periods to go is:
< 24 + 12(n-l) - 12 + 12n.
ROW's return to an A choice now is:
> 6nq - 5q + 12n - 26.
ROW should cooperate if:
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Al-7 ) 6nq - 5q + 12n - 26 > 12 + 12n or
n >
38-5q
6q
05
35
65
95
125.8
17.3
8.9
5.8
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Appendix 2
Equilibria and Potential Gains
in Games Against Actual Opponents
when both parties are rational, only three of the eight conditions in
this study admit sequential equilibria with some periods of cooperation, i.e.
choices of A by both sides, in: (a) Strong-Strong (SS), Both Uncertain; (b)
Strong-Weak (SW), Both Uncertain; and (c) SW, COLUMN Uncertain. Whenever one
side is strong and the other side knows this, the backwards induction argument
causes cooperation to unravel from the last period to the beginning. This
logic applies to five of the eight cases (SS with either or both sides
certain- -three cases--and SW with both sides or COLUMN certain--two cases).
We first examine the presence of cooperative equilibria. The SW. COLUMN
uncertain condition is relatively straight- forward. The analysis here draws
from Camerer and Weigelt (1988). A cooperative equilibrium requires mutual
cooperation for at least some of the game and consistent Bayesian updating by
COLUMN of the probability that ROW is weak. Consider COLUMN'S choice in a
supergame that has reached its 20th trial with nineteen periods of A-A
choices. If ROW is weak, A is dominant for ROW; if ROW is strong, B dominates
(by definition). Let P™ by COLUMN'S perceived probability on trial 20 that
ROW is weak (note that Pi - -5). Then the expected payoff to COLUMN of
choosing A in round 20 is:
18P 2Q + 5(1-P 20 ),
and COLUMN'S expected payoff for a B choice is:
10P 20 + 12(1-P 2Q ).
If COLUMN is risk-neutral, then on the last round of the game, COLUMN chooses
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A if and only if:
A2-1 )
-
I8P 20 + 5(1
" P 20 } - 10P 20 + 12(I
" P 20 } or
A2_i2) P2Q > 7/15 = .467.
Condition (2) will hold as long as COLUMN'S bel ief -updating process is
(in the sense of Kreps and Wilson, 1982) "plausible" - -when ROW chooses A.
COLUMN'S perceived probability that ROW is weak does not fall. The strong ROW
should choose B on the last round. However ROW will want to make sure that
COLUMN perceives a last round probability (Ptq ^ .467) that ROW is weak. For
any round t, let S be the probability that a strong ROW would choose to
cooperate in a mixed strategy for that round. In round 19, ROW would select
S to make sure that P2Q > .467 ROW's expected payoff in rounds 19 and 20
from such a strategy is:
A2 - 3 ) S
L9 (18+24) + (1-S 19 )(24+12) - 36 + 6S 19>
which increases monotonically in Sin. Thus, the strong ROW will choose S 1Q as
large as possible, consistent with P^q > .467.
By Bayes' rule:
A2-4 ) Pt =
P t-1 + S t-l( L - p t-l)-
Therefore, COLUMN cooperates in round 20 if
P 19
A2 - ? ) D > .467P 19 + S 19 (1
- p 19)
We begin with P, - .5; if belief updating is plausible and ROW has cooperated
(i.e., has chosen A) for 18 founds, then P^
9
> .5. By ( 3 ) and (5), S^ 9 = 1--
the strong ROW pushes S,q as high as possible such that
A2-6 ) S 1Q < > 1.19
.467 1-P ig
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Therefore, COLUMN learns nothing by ROW s cooperation through the first 19
rounds, and COLUMN cooperates in round 19, knowing that ROW will also
cooperate even if ROW is strong. Similar reasoning takes us back to period 1
Our purpose in constructing this game was to have at least one case vita
*
a clear cooperative equilibrium for the entire game, until ROW's last play
These payoffs should drive the strong ROW to never play a mixed strategy
(i.e., S - 1 for all t < 19). We therefore have the strong prediction that
one sequential equilibrium in this game has COLUMN choosing A in all 20
periods and ROW choosing A in periods 1-19 and B in period 20. Of course.
another sequential equilibrium has both parties choosing B throughout.
The two cases of two-sided uncertainty are more complicated. Sequential
equilibria do exist, however, in addition to constant B choices. Intuitively,
we expect earlier unraveling of cooperation in SS or SW with both uncertain
than in the SW, only COLUMN uncertain case. First, for SW both uncertain.
ROW's uncertainty of COLUMN'S strength increases ROW's incentive to protect
him/herself from a potentially strong COLUMN compared to a COLUMN known to be
weak. Second, in SS both uncertain, COLUMN does not "enjoy" cooperation when
it is met with cooperation. COLUMN now has greater short-period gains from
defection compared to the SW payoffs. Further, COLUMN perceives some
probability that his/her own B choices will be rewarded (if ROW is weak).
Nonetheless, the payoffs and information structure of these latter two games
do admit sequential equilibria with some mutual cooperation.
Note that the weak COLUMN should match ROW's A choices for the entire
supergame as long as there is a probability by the 20th round of at least .467
that ROW is weak (and as long as ROW's A choices do not reduce COLUMN'S
estimated probability that ROW is weak). In the two-sided uncertainty case.
COLUMN begins with a probability of .5 that ROW is weak (and vice versa).
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Thus at the beginning of the game ROW should know that COLUMN will match ROW/s
A choices for the entire game with a .5 probability. Suppose that N trials
remain in the game and neither side has defected from A choices. Then the
return to a strong ROW from matching COLUMN'S moves for the rest of the game
is at least:
A2-7 ) 18Np + (l-p)[5+(n-l)12] = 6Np + 12N + 7p - 7
,
where p is ROW's assessment that COLUMN is weak. If ROW defects from A now,
then ROW's maximum payoff for the rest of the game is: 24 + (N-l)12. The
return to ROW's tit-for-tat strategy is better if:
A2-8 ) 6Np + 12N + 7p - 7 > 24 + (N-l)12 or
19-7p
A2-9 ) N >
6
p
Since no one has defected yet, p should be at least .5. Therefore, tit-for-
tat for the rest of the game dominates defection now if at least 5.167 (or 6)
periods remain.
Thus, the strong ROW's equilibrium strategy dominates defection until at
most 6 trials are left; the strong ROW can play tit-for-tat for at least 14
periods. The weak COLUMN matches for the whole game . What if COLUMN is
strong?
A strong COLUMN should know that ROW will play tit-for-tat for at least
14 periods (and ROW will play A for the whole game if ROW is weak) . On the
other hand, if a strong COLUMN knew that ROW was weak, then COLUMN should play
B choices throughout the game. COLUMN learns nothing by ROW's tit-for-tat
play in the first 14 rounds; therefore, COLUMN'S assessment that ROW is weak
should remain at .5. The payoff to COLUMN from tit-for-tat for the first N
(for N < 14) periods of the game is: 18N. The payoff from defecting at the
44
start of these N periods is no more than:
A2-10 ) 20Np + (l-p)[20+12(N-l) ] = 8Np + 12N + 8 - 8p.
Tit-for-tat for N rounds dominates finking (i.e., the B choice) at the start
of the period if:
A2-11 ) L8N > 8Np + 12N + 8 - 8p or if
4-4p 1
A2- 12 ) N > or since p = -,
3-4p 2
A2-13 ) N > 2.
Thus, a strong COLUMN should match for at least two periods. (For high value;
of p, COLUMN defects from the start.) This is a considerably weaker
prediction of cooperation than for the weak COLUMN, since there is always a p
chance that the strong COLUMN'S defection will actually be rewarded. On the
other hand if ROW is strong, then COLUMN'S defection from A eliminates the
possibility of mutually-beneficial joint A choices. But when both are strong,
ROW matches for at least 14 periods, and COLUMN for at least two periods,
implying a cooperative equilibrium for at least two periods.
As noted, cooperative equilibria do not exist for five of the eight
possible conditions: Strong-Strong Neither Uncertain (SSNU); Strong-Strong
only ROW Uncertain (SSRU); Strong-Strong only COLUMN Uncertain (SSCU): Strong
-
Weak, Neither Uncertain (SWNU); and Strong-Weak only ROW Uncertain (SWRU).
However, the expected gains from equilibrium strategies (i.e., noncooperation;
relative to cooperating are not constant. Differences in these gains may
predict behavior when parties miscalculate their strategic returns or they
hold or perceive the other holding homemade probabilities for cooperation.
Intuitively, more cooperative behavior should be associated with smaller
losses from non-rational behavior. More systematically, we say that conditior
X yields more incentive for cooperation than condition Y if: (i) for each
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party, the expected loss in playing A (i.e., cooperatively) relative to B
(i.e., not cooperatively) given the opponent's behavior is no more under X
than Y; and (ii) there is at least one case (e.g., COLUMN'S payoffs when ROW
chooses B) such that the expected loss in playing A relative Co B is strictly
less under X than Y. This criterion is similar to Pareto-optiraalitv
.
Such a scheme generates unambiguous rankings for SWNU, SWRU, SSRU. and
SSNU (see Table 2). SWNU offers the most hope for cooperation since COLUMN
does not gain by choosing B when ROW chooses A, and both sides know this. The
SWRU condition should yield less cooperation since ROW is now not sure whether
COLUMN gains by choosing B in response to A. The SSRU condition offers the
next highest return for cooperation since COLUMN gains by choosing B in
response to ROW's A in SSRU but loses in SWRU (ROW's position is the same in
SSRU and SWRU due to ROW's uncertainty in each case). The SSNU offers fewer
chances for cooperation than SSRU since under SSNU, ROW knows that the payoffs
are those of the classic PD
.
The last payoff condition, SSCU, cannot be unambiguously ranked. SSCU
offers less potential for cooperation than SSBU since in the latter game ROW
perceives a 50 percent chance that COLUMN loses by playing B when ROW plays A;
in SSCU, ROW knows that COLUMN gains by playing B. Further, SSCU yields a
higher cooperation incentive than SSNU since COLUMN perceives a 50 percent
chance that ROW always gains by playing A; in SSNU, COLUMN knows that ROW
always loses by playing A. SSCU cannot, however, be unambiguously ranked
against SWNU, SWRU and SSRU.



